

# Logic

Lecture 2: classical logic

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## Classical semantics of propositional logic

Classical semantics adopts the *principle of bivalence*: every proposition denotes exactly one of the two truth-values, 0 (false) or 1 (true).

**Definition.** The set of *valuations* is defined to be  $\mathcal{PV} \rightarrow \mathbf{2}$ , where  $\mathbf{2} := \{0, 1\}$ .

**Definition.** Let  $\sigma$  be a valuation. The *truth-value interpretation*  $\llbracket \_ \rrbracket_\sigma : \text{PROP} \rightarrow \mathbf{2}$  of propositional formulas is defined by

$$\begin{aligned} \llbracket \perp \rrbracket_\sigma &= 0 \\ \llbracket v \rrbracket_\sigma &= \sigma v && \text{for } v : \mathcal{PV} \\ \llbracket \varphi \wedge \psi \rrbracket_\sigma &= \min \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket_\sigma \llbracket \psi \rrbracket_\sigma \\ \llbracket \varphi \vee \psi \rrbracket_\sigma &= \max \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket_\sigma \llbracket \psi \rrbracket_\sigma \\ \llbracket \varphi \rightarrow \psi \rrbracket_\sigma &= \text{if } \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket_\sigma \leq \llbracket \psi \rrbracket_\sigma \text{ then } 1 \text{ else } 0 \end{aligned}$$

## Meta-connectives

Let  $\sigma$  be a valuation.

- $[\neg\varphi]_{\sigma} = 1 \Leftrightarrow [\varphi]_{\sigma} \leq [\perp]_{\sigma} \Leftrightarrow [\varphi]_{\sigma} \leq 0 \Leftrightarrow [\varphi]_{\sigma} = 0.$
- $[\top]_{\sigma} = [\neg\perp]_{\sigma} = 1 - [\perp]_{\sigma} = 1 - 0 = 1.$
- $[\varphi \leftrightarrow \psi]_{\sigma} = 1$ 
  - $\Leftrightarrow$  { case ' $\wedge$ ' }
  - $\min [\varphi \rightarrow \psi]_{\sigma} [\psi \rightarrow \varphi]_{\sigma} = 1$
  - $\Leftrightarrow$  { arithmetic }
  - $[\varphi \rightarrow \psi]_{\sigma} = 1$  and  $[\psi \rightarrow \varphi]_{\sigma} = 1$
  - $\Leftrightarrow$  { case ' $\rightarrow$ ' }
  - $[\varphi]_{\sigma} \leq [\psi]_{\sigma}$  and  $[\psi]_{\sigma} \leq [\varphi]_{\sigma}$
  - $\Leftrightarrow$  { antisymmetry }
  - $[\varphi]_{\sigma} = [\psi]_{\sigma}.$

## Semantic definitions

**Definitions.** Let  $\varphi, \psi : \text{PROP}$  and  $\Gamma : \text{LIST PROP}$ .

- A valuation  $\sigma$  *satisfies*  $\varphi$  if  $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket_{\sigma} = 1$ ; it satisfies  $\Gamma$  if it satisfies every formula in  $\Gamma$ .
- $\varphi$  is a *semantic consequence* of  $\Gamma$  if, for any valuation  $\sigma$ ,  $\varphi$  is satisfied by  $\sigma$  whenever  $\Gamma$  is satisfied by  $\sigma$ . In this case we write  $\Gamma \models \varphi$ .
- $\varphi$  is *valid* if  $\emptyset \models \varphi$ . In this case  $\varphi$  is also called a *tautology*, and we simply write  $\models \varphi$ .
- $\varphi$  and  $\psi$  are *semantically equivalent* if  $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket_{\sigma} = \llbracket \psi \rrbracket_{\sigma}$  for every valuation  $\sigma$ . In this case we write  $\varphi \approx \psi$ .

Example:  $\models \varphi \vee \neg\varphi$

**ASSUME**  $\sigma : \mathcal{PV} \rightarrow \mathbf{2}$

**PROVE**  $\llbracket \varphi \vee \neg\varphi \rrbracket_\sigma = 1$

**PROOF** Case analysis on  $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket_\sigma$ .

**1** **CASE**  $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket_\sigma = 1$

**PROOF**  $\llbracket \varphi \vee \neg\varphi \rrbracket_\sigma = \max \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket_\sigma (1 - \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket_\sigma) = \max 1 0 = 1$ .

**2** **CASE**  $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket_\sigma = 0$

**PROOF**  $\llbracket \varphi \vee \neg\varphi \rrbracket_\sigma = \max \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket_\sigma (1 - \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket_\sigma) = \max 0 1 = 1$ .

**3** QED.

**PROOF** Either  $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket_\sigma = 1$  or  $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket_\sigma = 0$ ; **1** and **2**.

**Notation.** “**CASE** C” abbreviates “**ASSUME** C **PROVE** QED”.

## $\models \varphi \vee \neg\varphi$ — truth table method

We may just summarise the case analysis on  $\llbracket\varphi\rrbracket_\sigma$  and evaluation of the value of the entire propositional formula in a *truth table*.

$\varphi$	$\varphi$	$\vee$	$\neg$	$\varphi$
0	0	1	1	0
1	1	1	0	1

**Theorem.** Validity in classical propositional logic is *decidable*, i.e., there is a mechanical procedure that, given a propositional formula, decides whether it is valid or not in a finite amount of time.

## Reducing connectives

We do not actually need that many connectives for classical propositional logic.

**Definition.** The set  $\text{PROP}^-$  is inductively defined by the following rules:

- $\perp : \text{PROP}^-$ ;
- $v : \text{PROP}^-$  if  $v : \mathcal{PV}$ ;
- $\varphi \rightarrow \psi : \text{PROP}^-$  if  $\varphi, \psi : \text{PROP}^-$ .

**Definition.** Let the function  $\_{}^+ : \text{PROP}^- \rightarrow \text{PROP}$  be defined by

$$\begin{aligned}\perp^+ &= \perp \\ v^+ &= v && \text{for } v : \mathcal{PV} \\ (\varphi \rightarrow \psi)^+ &= \varphi^+ \rightarrow \psi^+.\end{aligned}$$

## Reducing connectives

**Theorem.** For every  $\varphi : \text{PROP}$ , there exists  $\varphi^- : \text{PROP}^-$  such that  $\varphi \approx (\varphi^-)^+$ .

**PROOF** Induction on  $\varphi$ .

**1**  $\perp \approx (\varphi^-)^+$  for some  $\varphi^- : \text{PROP}^-$ .

**PROOF** Choose  $\varphi^- := \perp$ .

**2** **ASSUME**  $v : \mathcal{PV}$

**PROVE**  $v \approx (\varphi^-)^+$  for some  $\varphi^- : \text{PROP}^-$

**PROOF** Choose  $\varphi^- := v$ .



## Reducing connectives

**3** **ASSUME**  $\psi : \text{PROP}$ ,  $\psi^- : \text{PROP}^-$ ,  $\psi \approx (\psi^-)^+$ ,  
 $\vartheta : \text{PROP}$ ,  $\vartheta^- : \text{PROP}^-$ ,  $\vartheta \approx (\vartheta^-)^+$

**PROVE**  $\psi \wedge \vartheta \approx (\varphi^-)^+$  for some  $\varphi^- : \text{PROP}^-$

**PROOF** Choose  $\varphi^- := \neg(\psi^- \rightarrow \neg\vartheta^-)$ , which is justified by the following truth table:

$\psi$	$\vartheta$	$\psi$	$\wedge$	$\vartheta$	$\leftrightarrow$	$\neg$	$(\psi^-)^+$	$\rightarrow$	$\neg$	$(\vartheta^-)^+$
0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0
0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	1
1	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	0
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1

**Lemma.**  $\varphi \approx \psi$  if and only if  $\models \varphi \leftrightarrow \psi$ .

## Reducing connectives

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ASSUME

$\psi : \text{PROP}$ ,  $\psi^- : \text{PROP}^-$ ,  $\psi \approx (\psi^-)^+$ ,  
 $\vartheta : \text{PROP}$ ,  $\vartheta^- : \text{PROP}^-$ ,  $\vartheta \approx (\vartheta^-)^+$

PROVE

$\psi \vee \vartheta \approx (\varphi^-)^+$  for some  $\varphi^- : \text{PROP}^-$

PROOF

Choose  $\varphi^- := \neg\psi^- \rightarrow \vartheta^-$ , which is justified by the following truth table:

$\psi$	$\vartheta$	$\psi$	$\vee$	$\vartheta$	$\leftrightarrow$	$(\neg$	$(\psi^-)^+$	$\rightarrow$	$(\vartheta^-)^+$
0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0
0	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1
1	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	0
1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1

## Reducing connectives

5 **ASSUME**  $\psi : \text{PROP}$ ,  $\psi^- : \text{PROP}^-$ ,  $\psi \approx (\psi^-)^+$ ,  
 $\vartheta : \text{PROP}$ ,  $\vartheta^- : \text{PROP}^-$ ,  $\vartheta \approx (\vartheta^-)^+$

**PROVE**  $\psi \rightarrow \vartheta \approx (\varphi^-)^+$  for some  $\varphi^- : \text{PROP}^-$

**PROOF** Choose  $\varphi^- := \psi^- \rightarrow \vartheta^-$ .

6 **QED.**

**PROOF** By **1**–**5** and the induction principle on  $\text{PROP}$ .

## Soundness

From now on we assume that  $\_+$  is implicitly applied where needed.

**Theorem.**  $\vdash_{\text{NJ}^-} \varphi$  implies  $\models \varphi$  for every  $\varphi : \text{PROP}^-$ .

**PROOF** Semantic truth is preserved by every deduction rule.

**1**  $\Gamma \vdash_{\text{NJ}^-} \varphi$  implies  $\Gamma \models \varphi$  for every  $\varphi : \text{PROP}^-$  and  $\Gamma : \text{LIST PROP}^-$ .

**PROOF** Induction on the derivation of  $\Gamma \vdash_{\text{NJ}^-} \varphi$ .

**2** QED.

**PROOF** Choose  $\Gamma := \emptyset$  in **1**.

## Inductive definition of derivations

**Definition.** The sets  $\text{NJ}^-[\Gamma; \varphi]$  of (closed) derivations, where  $\Gamma$  ranges over  $\text{LIST PROP}^-$  and  $\varphi$  over  $\text{PROP}^-$ , are inductively defined by the following rules:

- $\frac{}{\Gamma \vdash \varphi}$  (assum) :  $\text{NJ}^-[\Gamma; \varphi]$  if  $\varphi \in \Gamma$ ;
- $\frac{d}{\Gamma \vdash \varphi}$  ( $\perp\text{E}$ ) :  $\text{NJ}^-[\Gamma; \varphi]$  if  $d : \text{NJ}^-[\Gamma; \perp]$ ;
- $\frac{d}{\Gamma \vdash \varphi \rightarrow \psi}$  ( $\rightarrow\text{I}$ ) :  $\text{NJ}^-[\Gamma; \varphi \rightarrow \psi]$  if  $d : \text{NJ}^-[\Gamma, \varphi; \psi]$ ;
- $\frac{d}{\Gamma \vdash \psi}$  ( $\rightarrow\text{E}$ ) :  $\text{NJ}^-[\Gamma; \psi]$  if  $d : \text{NJ}^-[\Gamma; \varphi \rightarrow \psi]$  and  $e : \text{NJ}^-[\Gamma; \varphi]$ .

**Definition.**  $\varphi$  is *derivable* from  $\Gamma$  in  $\text{NJ}^-$  if the set  $\text{NJ}^-[\Gamma; \varphi]$  is inhabited. In this case we write  $\Gamma \vdash_{\text{NJ}^-} \varphi$ .

Treating proofs as formal objects is the defining characteristic of *proof theory*.

## Induction principle on $\text{NJ}^-$

The rule

$$\blacksquare \frac{d}{\Gamma \vdash \varphi \rightarrow \psi} (\rightarrow I) : \text{NJ}^-[\Gamma; \varphi \rightarrow \psi] \quad \text{if} \quad d : \text{NJ}^-[\Gamma, \varphi; \psi]$$

is interpreted as “if  $d$  is a derivation with conclusion  $\Gamma, \varphi \vdash \psi$ , then

$\frac{d}{\Gamma \vdash \varphi \rightarrow \psi} (\rightarrow I)$  is a derivation with conclusion  $\Gamma \vdash \varphi \rightarrow \psi$ ”.

Let  $P \Gamma \varphi d$  be a property on  $\Gamma : \text{LIST PROP}^-$ ,  $\varphi : \text{PROP}^-$ , and  $d : \text{NJ}^-[\Gamma; \varphi]$ , i.e.,  $P$  talks about a derivation  $d$  and the context  $\Gamma$  and formula  $\varphi$  in the conclusion of  $d$ . The corresponding case of the above rule in the induction principle on  $\text{NJ}^-$  is

$$\blacksquare \text{For any } \Gamma : \text{LIST PROP}^-, \varphi, \psi \in \text{PROP}^-, \text{ and } d : \text{NJ}^-[\Gamma, \varphi; \psi], \\ P \Gamma (\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \left( \frac{d}{\Gamma \vdash \varphi \rightarrow \psi} (\rightarrow I) \right) \text{ holds if } P (\Gamma, \varphi) \psi d \text{ holds.}$$

## Soundness

**1**  $\Gamma \vdash_{\text{NJ}^-} \varphi$  implies  $\Gamma \models \varphi$  for every  $\varphi : \text{PROP}^-$  and  $\Gamma : \text{LIST PROP}^-$ .

**PROVE**  $\Gamma \models \varphi$  holds for every  $\Gamma : \text{LIST PROP}^-$  and  $\varphi : \text{PROP}^-$  such that  $\Gamma \vdash_{\text{NJ}^-} \varphi$ .

**PROOF** Induction on the derivation of  $\Gamma \vdash_{\text{NJ}^-} \varphi$ .

**1.1** Case (assum).

**ASSUME**  $\Gamma : \text{LIST PROP}^-$ ,  $\varphi : \text{PROP}^-$ ,  $\varphi \in \Gamma$ ,  
 $\sigma : \mathcal{PV} \rightarrow \mathbf{2}$ ,  $\sigma$  satisfies  $\Gamma$

**PROVE**  $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket_{\sigma} = 1$

**PROOF** Since  $\sigma$  satisfies  $\Gamma$  and  $\varphi \in \Gamma$ .

## Soundness

### 1.2 Case ( $\perp$ E).

**ASSUME**  $\Gamma : \text{LIST PROP}^-$ ,  $\Gamma \vdash_{\text{NJ}^-} \perp$ ,  $\Gamma \models \perp$ ,  
 $\varphi : \text{PROP}^-$ ,  $\sigma : \mathcal{PV} \rightarrow \mathbf{2}$ ,  $\sigma$  satisfies  $\Gamma$

**PROVE**  $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket_{\sigma} = 1$

**PROOF** Such  $\sigma$  could not have been given.

**1.2.1**  $\llbracket \perp \rrbracket_{\sigma} = 0$ .

**PROOF** By definition.

**1.2.2**  $\llbracket \perp \rrbracket_{\sigma} = 1$ .

**PROOF**  $\Gamma \models \perp$  and  $\sigma$  satisfies  $\Gamma$ .

**1.2.3** QED.

**PROOF** [1.2.1](#) and [1.2.2](#) are contradictory —  
invoke the principle of explosion.



# Soundness

## 1.3 Case ( $\rightarrow$ I).

**ASSUME**  $\Gamma : \text{LIST PROP}^-$ ,  $\varphi, \psi : \text{PROP}^-$ ,  
 $\Gamma, \varphi \vdash_{\text{NJ}^-} \psi$ ,  $\Gamma, \varphi \models \psi$ ,  
 $\sigma : \mathcal{PV} \rightarrow \mathbf{2}$ ,  $\sigma$  satisfies  $\Gamma$

**PROVE**  $\llbracket \varphi \rightarrow \psi \rrbracket_{\sigma} = 1$

**PROOF** Case analysis on the truth value of  $\varphi$ .

**1.3.1** **CASE**  $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket_{\sigma} = 0$

**1.3.2** **CASE**  $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket_{\sigma} = 1$

**1.3.3** QED.

**PROOF** By **1.3.1** and **1.3.2**.

# Soundness

1.3.1

CASE

$$\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket_{\sigma} = 0$$

PROOF

$$\llbracket \varphi \rightarrow \psi \rrbracket_{\sigma} = 1$$

$\Leftrightarrow$  { definition of truth }

$$\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket_{\sigma} \leq \llbracket \psi \rrbracket_{\sigma}$$

$\Leftrightarrow$  { assumption }

$$0 \leq \llbracket \psi \rrbracket_{\sigma}$$

$\Leftrightarrow$  { truth value is either 0 or 1 }

*true.*

# Soundness

1.3.2 CASE  $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket_{\sigma} = 1$

PROOF  $\psi$  must be true, and therefore so must  $\varphi \rightarrow \psi$ .

1.3.2.1  $\sigma$  satisfies  $\Gamma, \varphi$ .

PROOF  $\sigma$  satisfies  $\Gamma$  and  $\varphi$ .

1.3.2.2  $\llbracket \psi \rrbracket_{\sigma} = 1$ .

PROOF  $\Gamma, \varphi \models \psi$  and [1.3.2.1](#).

1.3.2.3 QED.

PROOF

$\llbracket \varphi \rightarrow \psi \rrbracket_{\sigma} = 1$   
 $\Leftrightarrow$  { definition of truth }  
 $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket_{\sigma} \leq \llbracket \psi \rrbracket_{\sigma}$   
 $\Leftrightarrow$  { 1.3.2.2 }  
 $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket_{\sigma} \leq 1$   
 $\Leftrightarrow$  { truth value is either 0 or 1 }  
*true.*

# Soundness

1.4 Case ( $\rightarrow$ E).

**ASSUME**  $\Gamma : \text{LIST PROP}^-, \varphi, \psi : \text{PROP}^-,$   
 $\Gamma \vdash_{\text{NJ}^-} \varphi \rightarrow \psi, \Gamma \models \varphi \rightarrow \psi, \Gamma \vdash_{\text{NJ}^-} \varphi, \Gamma \models \varphi,$   
 $\sigma : \mathcal{PV} \rightarrow \mathbf{2}, \sigma$  satisfies  $\Gamma$

**PROVE**  $\llbracket \psi \rrbracket_{\sigma} = 1$

**PROOF** Left as an exercise.

1.5 QED.

**PROOF** By [1.1](#) – [1.4](#) and the induction principle on  $\text{NJ}^-$ .

## Semantic completeness

**Non-theorem.**  $\models \varphi$  implies  $\vdash_{\text{NJ}^-} \varphi$  for any  $\varphi : \text{PROP}^-$ .

**Counterexample.** We have  $\models \neg\neg A \rightarrow A$  but not  $\vdash_{\text{NJ}^-} \neg\neg A \rightarrow A$ .

If, however, we extend  $\text{NJ}^-$  to  $\text{NK}^-$  with the rule

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash \neg\neg\varphi}{\Gamma \vdash \varphi} (\neg\neg\text{E})$$

we do obtain semantic completeness of  $\text{NK}^-$  with respect to the truth-value semantics.

**Theorem.**  $\models \varphi$  implies  $\vdash_{\text{NK}^-} \varphi$  for any  $\varphi : \text{PROP}^-$ .

## The $NK^-$ deduction system

**Definition.** The sets  $NK^-[\Gamma; \varphi]$  of (closed) derivations, where  $\Gamma$  ranges over  $LIST\ PROP^-$  and  $\varphi$  over  $PROP^-$ , are inductively defined by the following rules:

- $\frac{}{\Gamma \vdash \varphi}$  (assum) :  $NK^-[\Gamma; \varphi]$  if  $\varphi \in \Gamma$ ;
- $\frac{d}{\Gamma \vdash \varphi}$  ( $\perp E$ ) :  $NK^-[\Gamma; \varphi]$  if  $d : NK^-[\Gamma; \perp]$ ;
- $\frac{d}{\Gamma \vdash \varphi \rightarrow \psi}$  ( $\rightarrow I$ ) :  $NK^-[\Gamma; \varphi \rightarrow \psi]$  if  $d : NK^-[\Gamma, \varphi; \psi]$ ;
- $\frac{d}{\Gamma \vdash \psi}$  ( $\rightarrow E$ ) :  $NK^-[\Gamma; \psi]$  if  $d : NK^-[\Gamma; \varphi \rightarrow \psi]$  and  $e : NK^-[\Gamma; \varphi]$ ;
- $\frac{d}{\Gamma \vdash \varphi}$  ( $\neg\neg E$ ) :  $NK^-[\Gamma; \varphi]$  if  $d : NK^-[\Gamma; \neg\neg\varphi]$ .

**Definition.**  $\varphi$  is *derivable* from  $\Gamma$  in  $NK^-$  if the set  $NK^-[\Gamma; \varphi]$  is inhabited. In this case we write  $\Gamma \vdash_{NK^-} \varphi$ .

## Weakening lemma

**Lemma.** Let  $\Gamma, \Gamma' : \text{LIST PROP}^-$  such that  $\Gamma \subseteq \Gamma'$  (i.e.,  $\varphi \in \Gamma$  implies  $\varphi \in \Gamma'$  for any  $\varphi$ ). Then  $\Gamma \vdash_{\text{NK}^-} \varphi$  implies  $\Gamma' \vdash_{\text{NK}^-} \varphi$  for any  $\varphi : \text{PROP}^-$ .

**PROOF**

Induction on the derivation of  $\Gamma \vdash_{\text{NK}^-} \varphi$ .

## Reconstruction lemma

**Definition.** The function  $\text{vars} : \text{PROP}^- \rightarrow \text{LIST } \mathcal{PV}$ , which computes the list of propositional variables occurring in a propositional formula, is defined by

$$\begin{aligned}\text{vars } \perp &= \emptyset \\ \text{vars } v &= [v] && \text{for } v : \mathcal{PV} \\ \text{vars } (\varphi \rightarrow \psi) &= \text{vars } \varphi \cup \text{vars } \psi\end{aligned}$$

**Lemma.** Let  $\varphi : \text{PROP}^-$  and  $\sigma : \mathcal{PV} \rightarrow \mathbf{2}$ . Define

$$T_\sigma \psi := \text{if } \llbracket \psi \rrbracket_\sigma = 1 \text{ then } \psi \text{ else } \neg\psi.$$

Then  $T_\sigma (\text{vars } \varphi) \vdash_{\text{NK}^-} T_\sigma \varphi$ , where

$$T_\sigma (\text{vars } \varphi) = [ T_\sigma v \mid v \in \text{vars } \varphi ].$$

**PROOF**

Induction on  $\varphi$ .



## Reconstruction lemma

1  $\vdash_{\text{NK}^-} \neg \perp$ .

PROOF  $\frac{\perp \vdash \perp}{\vdash \neg \perp} (\rightarrow\text{I})$

2 ASSUME  $v : \mathcal{PV}$

PROVE  $T_\sigma v \vdash_{\text{NK}^-} T_\sigma v$

PROOF  $\frac{}{T_\sigma v \vdash T_\sigma v} (\text{assum})$

## Reconstruction lemma

**3** **ASSUME**  $\varphi : \text{PROP}^-$ ,  $T_\sigma(\text{vars } \varphi) \vdash_{\text{NK}^-} T_\sigma \varphi$ ,  
 $\psi : \text{PROP}^-$ ,  $T_\sigma(\text{vars } \psi) \vdash_{\text{NK}^-} T_\sigma \psi$

**PROVE**  $T_\sigma(\text{vars } (\varphi \rightarrow \psi)) \vdash_{\text{NK}^-} T_\sigma(\varphi \rightarrow \psi)$

**PROOF** Case analysis to determine  $T_\sigma(\varphi \rightarrow \psi)$ .

**3.1** **CASE**  $[[\psi]]_\sigma = 1$

**3.2** **CASE**  $[[\psi]]_\sigma = 0$

**PROOF** Left as an exercise.

**3.3** QED.

**PROOF** By **3.1** and **3.2**.

**4** QED.

**PROOF** By **1**–**3** and the induction principle on  $\text{PROP}^-$ .

## Reconstruction lemma

**3.1** **CASE**  $\llbracket \psi \rrbracket_\sigma = 1$

**PROOF** In this case  $T_\sigma (\varphi \rightarrow \psi) = \varphi \rightarrow \psi$ . We can prove  $\psi$  and thus  $\varphi \rightarrow \psi$ .

**3.1.1**  $T_\sigma (\text{vars } \psi) \vdash_{\text{NK}^-} \psi$ .

**PROOF** Induction hypothesis  $T_\sigma (\text{vars } \psi) \vdash_{\text{NK}^-} T_\sigma \psi$ , where  $T_\sigma \psi = \psi$  since  $\llbracket \psi \rrbracket_\sigma = 1$ .

**3.1.2** **LET**  $d : \text{NK}^- [T_\sigma (\text{vars } (\varphi \rightarrow \psi)), \varphi; \psi]$

**PROOF** **3.1.1** and weakening.

**3.1.3** QED.

**PROOF** 
$$\frac{d}{T_\sigma (\text{vars } (\varphi \rightarrow \psi)) \vdash \varphi \rightarrow \psi} (\rightarrow\text{I})$$

## Semantic completeness

**Theorem.**  $\models \varphi$  implies  $\vdash_{\text{NK}^-} \varphi$  for any  $\varphi : \text{PROP}^-$ .

**PROOF**

Construct a derivation that encodes the truth table, where each sub-derivation that encodes an entry of the table is produced by the reconstruction lemma.

**1** For any finite  $\Gamma : \text{LIST } \mathcal{PV}$  whose elements are all distinct,  $\mathcal{T}_\sigma \Gamma \vdash_{\text{NK}^-} \varphi$  for any  $\sigma$  implies  $\vdash_{\text{NK}^-} \varphi$ .

**PROOF**

Induction on (the size of)  $\Gamma$ .

**2** QED.

**PROOF**

Choose  $\Gamma := \text{vars } \varphi$  in **1**.

## Semantic completeness

2 QED.

**PROOF** Choose  $\Gamma := \text{vars } \varphi$  in [1](#).

**2.1**  $T_\sigma(\text{vars } \varphi) \vdash_{\text{NK}^-} T_\sigma \varphi$  for any  $\sigma$ .

**PROOF** By the reconstruction lemma.

**2.2**  $T_\sigma(\text{vars } \varphi) \vdash_{\text{NK}^-} \varphi$  for any  $\sigma$ .

**PROOF** In [2.1](#),  $T_\sigma \varphi = \varphi$  for any  $\sigma$  since  $\varphi$  is valid.

**2.3** QED.

**PROOF** Choose  $\Gamma := \text{vars } \varphi$  in [1](#) and discharge the condition by [2.2](#).

## Semantic completeness

- 1** For any finite  $\Gamma : \text{LIST } \mathcal{PV}$  whose elements are all distinct,  $T_\sigma \Gamma \vdash_{\text{NK}^-} \varphi$  for any  $\sigma$  implies  $\vdash_{\text{NK}^-} \varphi$ .

**PROOF** Induction on (the size of)  $\Gamma$ .

- 1.1**  $\vdash_{\text{NK}^-} \varphi$  for any  $\sigma$  implies  $\vdash_{\text{NK}^-} \varphi$ .

**PROOF** Use the condition by choosing an arbitrary  $\sigma$ .

- 1.2** **ASSUME**  $\Gamma : \text{LIST } \mathcal{PV}$  consisting of a finite number of distinct elements,  $v : \mathcal{PV}$ ,  $v \notin \Gamma$ ,  
 $T_\sigma \Gamma \vdash_{\text{NK}^-} \varphi$  for any  $\sigma$  implies  $\vdash_{\text{NK}^-} \varphi$ ,  
 $T_\sigma \Gamma, T_\sigma v \vdash_{\text{NK}^-} \varphi$  for any  $\sigma$

**PROVE**  $\vdash_{\text{NK}^-} \varphi$

- 1.3** QED.

**PROOF** By **1.1** – **1.2** and the induction principle on lists.

## Semantic completeness

**1.2** **ASSUME**  $\Gamma : \text{LIST } \mathcal{PV}$  consisting of a finite number of distinct elements,  $v : \mathcal{PV}$ ,  $v \notin \Gamma$ ,  
 $T_\sigma \Gamma \vdash_{\text{NK}^-} \varphi$  for any  $\sigma$  implies  $\vdash_{\text{NK}^-} \varphi$ ,  
 $T_\sigma \Gamma, T_\sigma v \vdash_{\text{NK}^-} \varphi$  for any  $\sigma$

**PROVE**  $\vdash_{\text{NK}^-} \varphi$

**PROOF** Use the induction hypothesis.

**1.2.1**  $T_\sigma \Gamma, v \vdash_{\text{NK}^-} \varphi$  for any  $\sigma$ .

**1.2.2**  $T_\sigma \Gamma, \neg v \vdash_{\text{NK}^-} \varphi$  for any  $\sigma$ .

**1.2.3**  $T_\sigma \Gamma \vdash_{\text{NK}^-} \varphi$  for any  $\sigma$ .

**1.2.4** QED.

**PROOF** Discharge the condition of the induction hypothesis by **1.2.3**.

## Semantic completeness

**1.2.1**  $T_\sigma \Gamma, v \vdash_{\text{NK}^-} \varphi$  for any  $\sigma$ .

**PROOF** Given  $\sigma$ , instantiate the last assumption with  $\sigma [1/v]$ . Then  $T_{\sigma [1/v]} v = v$ , and  $T_{\sigma [1/v]} \Gamma = T_\sigma \Gamma$  since  $v \notin \Gamma$ .

**1.2.2**  $T_\sigma \Gamma, \neg v \vdash_{\text{NK}^-} \varphi$  for any  $\sigma$ .

**PROOF** Similar to [1.2.1](#) but instantiating the assumption with  $\sigma [0/v]$ .

**Definition.** Let  $f: S \rightarrow T$ ,  $s: S$ , and  $t: T$ . The function  $f[t/s]: S \rightarrow T$  is defined by

$$(f[t/s]) x := \text{if } x = s \text{ then } t \text{ else } f x.$$



## Semantic completeness

**1.2.3**  $T_\sigma \Gamma \vdash_{\text{NK}^-} \varphi$  for any  $\sigma$ .

**ASSUME**  $\sigma : \mathcal{PV} \rightarrow \mathbf{2}$

**PROVE**  $T_\sigma \Gamma \vdash_{\text{NK}^-} \varphi$

**PROOF** Refute  $\neg\varphi$  and use double negation elimination.

**1.2.3.1** **LET**  $d : \text{NK}^- [T_\sigma \Gamma, \neg\varphi, v; \varphi]$

**PROOF** [1.2.1](#) and weakening.

**1.2.3.2** **LET**  $e : \text{NK}^- [T_\sigma \Gamma, \neg\varphi, \neg v; \varphi]$

**PROOF** [1.2.2](#) and weakening.

**1.2.3.3** QED.

## Semantic completeness

1.2.3.3 QED.

PROOF

$$\frac{\frac{\frac{\Delta, \neg v \vdash \neg \varphi}{\Delta, \neg v \vdash \perp} (\rightarrow I)}{\Delta \vdash \neg \neg v} (\rightarrow E)}{\Delta} \quad \frac{\frac{\frac{\Delta, v \vdash \neg \varphi}{\Delta, v \vdash \perp} (\rightarrow I)}{\Delta \vdash \neg v} (\rightarrow E)}{\Delta} \quad \frac{\frac{\frac{\Delta, \neg v \vdash \neg \varphi}{\Delta, \neg v \vdash \perp} (\rightarrow I)}{\Delta \vdash \neg \neg v} (\rightarrow E)}{\Delta} \quad \frac{\frac{\frac{\Delta, v \vdash \neg \varphi}{\Delta, v \vdash \perp} (\rightarrow I)}{\Delta \vdash \neg v} (\rightarrow E)}{\Delta}$$
$$\frac{\frac{\frac{\overbrace{T_\sigma \Gamma, \neg \varphi \vdash \perp}^{\Delta}}{T_\sigma \Gamma \vdash \neg \neg \varphi} (\rightarrow I)}{T_\sigma \Gamma \vdash \varphi} (\neg \neg E)}{\Delta}$$

## Classical semantics of first-order logic

**Definition.** Given a signature  $\mathcal{S} = (\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{F})$ , an  $\mathcal{S}$ -*structure*  $\mathcal{M}$  consists of

- a nonempty set called the *domain*, which is simply denoted by  $\mathcal{M}$ ,
- a function  $\llbracket p \rrbracket_{\mathcal{M}} : (\mathcal{M} \rightarrow)^n \mathbf{2}$  for each predicate symbol  $p : \mathcal{P}$  of arity  $n$ , and
- a function  $\llbracket f \rrbracket_{\mathcal{M}} : (\mathcal{M} \rightarrow)^n \mathcal{M}$  for each function symbol  $f : \mathcal{F}$  of arity  $n$ .

**Definition.** Given a structure  $\mathcal{M}$ , the set of  $\mathcal{M}$ -*assignments* is defined to be  $\mathcal{IV} \rightarrow \mathcal{M}$ .

## Classical semantics of first-order logic

**Definition.** Let  $\mathcal{S} = (\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{F})$  be a signature,  $\mathcal{M}$  an  $\mathcal{S}$ -structure, and  $\sigma$  an  $\mathcal{M}$ -assignment. The *truth-value interpretation*

$\llbracket \_ \rrbracket_{\mathcal{M}, \sigma} : \text{FORM}_{\mathcal{S}} \rightarrow \mathbf{2}$  of formulas is defined as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \llbracket \perp \rrbracket_{\mathcal{M}, \sigma} &= 0 \\ \llbracket p \ t_1 \dots t_n \rrbracket_{\mathcal{M}, \sigma} &= \llbracket p \rrbracket_{\mathcal{M}} \ \llbracket t_1 \rrbracket_{\mathcal{M}, \sigma} \dots \llbracket t_n \rrbracket_{\mathcal{M}, \sigma} \quad \text{for } p : \mathcal{P} \\ \llbracket \varphi \wedge \psi \rrbracket_{\mathcal{M}, \sigma} &= \min \ \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket_{\mathcal{M}, \sigma} \ \llbracket \psi \rrbracket_{\mathcal{M}, \sigma} \\ \llbracket \varphi \vee \psi \rrbracket_{\mathcal{M}, \sigma} &= \max \ \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket_{\mathcal{M}, \sigma} \ \llbracket \psi \rrbracket_{\mathcal{M}, \sigma} \\ \llbracket \varphi \rightarrow \psi \rrbracket_{\mathcal{M}, \sigma} &= \text{if } \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket_{\mathcal{M}, \sigma} \leq \llbracket \psi \rrbracket_{\mathcal{M}, \sigma} \text{ then } 1 \text{ else } 0 \\ \llbracket \forall v. \varphi \rrbracket_{\mathcal{M}, \sigma} &= \text{if } \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket_{\mathcal{M}, \sigma[m/v]} = 1 \text{ for every } m : \mathcal{M} \\ &\quad \text{then } 1 \text{ else } 0 \\ \llbracket \exists v. \varphi \rrbracket_{\mathcal{M}, \sigma} &= \text{if } \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket_{\mathcal{M}, \sigma[m/v]} = 0 \text{ for every } m : \mathcal{M} \\ &\quad \text{then } 0 \text{ else } 1 \end{aligned}$$

where  $\llbracket \_ \rrbracket_{\mathcal{M}, \sigma} : \text{TERM}_{\mathcal{F}} \rightarrow \mathcal{M}$  is defined as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \llbracket v \rrbracket_{\mathcal{M}, \sigma} &= \sigma v && \text{for } v : \mathcal{IV} \\ \llbracket f \ t_1 \dots t_n \rrbracket_{\mathcal{M}, \sigma} &= \llbracket f \rrbracket_{\mathcal{M}} \ \llbracket t_1 \rrbracket_{\mathcal{M}, \sigma} \dots \llbracket t_n \rrbracket_{\mathcal{M}, \sigma} && \text{for } f : \mathcal{F}. \end{aligned}$$

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## Semantic definitions

**Definitions.** Let  $\mathcal{S}$  be a signature,  $\varphi, \psi : \text{FORM}_{\mathcal{S}}$ , and  $\Gamma : \text{LIST FORM}_{\mathcal{S}}$ .

- An  $\mathcal{S}$ -structure  $\mathcal{M}$  and an  $\mathcal{M}$ -assignment  $\sigma$  *satisfy*  $\varphi$  if  $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket_{\mathcal{M}, \sigma} = 1$ ; they satisfy  $\Gamma$  if they satisfy every formula in  $\Gamma$ .
- $\varphi$  is a *semantic consequence* of  $\Gamma$  if, for any  $\mathcal{S}$ -structure  $\mathcal{M}$  and  $\mathcal{M}$ -assignment  $\sigma$ ,  $\varphi$  is satisfied by  $\mathcal{M}$  and  $\sigma$  whenever  $\Gamma$  is satisfied by  $\mathcal{M}$  and  $\sigma$ . In this case we write  $\Gamma \models \varphi$ .
- $\varphi$  is *valid* if  $\emptyset \models \varphi$ . In this case we also call  $\varphi$  a *tautology* and simply write  $\models \varphi$ .
- $\varphi$  and  $\psi$  are *semantically equivalent*, written  $\varphi \approx \psi$ , if  $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket_{\mathcal{M}, \sigma} = \llbracket \psi \rrbracket_{\mathcal{M}, \sigma}$  for every  $\mathcal{S}$ -structure  $\mathcal{M}$  and  $\mathcal{M}$ -assignment  $\sigma$ .

## Semantic definitions

**Definitions.** Let  $\mathcal{M}$  be a structure,  $\varphi$  a sentence, and  $\mathcal{T}$  a theory.

- $\mathcal{M}$  *satisfies*  $\varphi$  if  $\varphi$  is satisfied by  $\mathcal{M}$  and any  $\mathcal{M}$ -assignment  $\sigma$ . In this case we call  $\mathcal{M}$  a *model* of  $\varphi$  and write  $\mathcal{M} \models \varphi$ .
- $\mathcal{M}$  *satisfies*  $\mathcal{T}$  if  $\mathcal{M}$  satisfies every axiom in  $\mathcal{T}$ . In this case we call  $\mathcal{M}$  a *model* of  $\mathcal{T}$  and write  $\mathcal{M} \models \mathcal{T}$ .
- $\mathcal{T}$  is *satisfiable* or (semantically) *consistent* if it has a model.

This satisfaction relation is at the heart of *model theory*, which we do not cover in this course.

Example:  $\models \neg(\forall v. \neg\varphi) \leftrightarrow \exists v. \varphi$

Equivalently we can prove that  $\neg(\forall v. \neg\varphi) \approx \exists v. \varphi$ .

**ASSUME**  $\mathcal{S}$  : signature,  $\mathcal{M}$  :  $\mathcal{S}$ -structure,  $\sigma$  :  $\mathcal{M}$ -assignment

**PROVE**  $\llbracket \neg(\forall v. \neg\varphi) \rrbracket_{\mathcal{M}, \sigma} = 1$  if and only if  $\llbracket \exists v. \varphi \rrbracket_{\mathcal{M}, \sigma} = 1$



Example:  $\models \neg(\forall v. \neg\varphi) \leftrightarrow \exists v. \varphi$

**PROOF** By definition of truth-value interpretation.

$$\begin{aligned} & \llbracket \neg(\forall v. \neg\varphi) \rrbracket_{\mathcal{M}, \sigma} = 1 \\ \Leftrightarrow & \quad \{ \text{truth value of '}\neg\text{'} \} \\ & \llbracket \forall v. \neg\varphi \rrbracket_{\mathcal{M}, \sigma} = 0 \\ \Leftrightarrow & \quad \{ \text{truth value is either 0 or 1} \} \\ & \text{it is not the case that } \llbracket \forall v. \neg\varphi \rrbracket_{\mathcal{M}, \sigma} = 1 \\ \Leftrightarrow & \quad \{ \text{truth value of '}\forall\text{'} \} \\ & \text{it is not the case that } \llbracket \neg\varphi \rrbracket_{\mathcal{M}, \sigma[m/v]} = 1 \text{ for every } m : \mathcal{M} \\ \Leftrightarrow & \quad \{ \text{truth value of '}\neg\text{'} \} \\ & \text{it is not the case that } \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket_{\mathcal{M}, \sigma[m/v]} = 0 \text{ for every } m : \mathcal{M} \\ \Leftrightarrow & \quad \{ \text{truth value of '}\exists\text{'} \} \\ & \text{it is not the case that } \llbracket \exists v. \varphi \rrbracket_{\mathcal{M}, \sigma} = 0 \\ \Leftrightarrow & \quad \{ \text{truth value is either 0 or 1} \} \\ & \llbracket \exists v. \varphi \rrbracket_{\mathcal{M}, \sigma} = 1 \end{aligned}$$

## Soundness and semantic completeness

**Theorem.**  $\vdash_{\text{NJ}} \varphi$  (or  $\vdash_{\text{NK}} \varphi$ ) implies  $\models \varphi$  for any first-order formula  $\varphi$ .

Completeness is trickier:

- classically it is a well-known result first proved by Gödel, but
- intuitionistically it has been shown to be unprovable by known methods unless we switch to a more sophisticated semantics.

Assuming completeness, we get the following undecidability result as a corollary of the negative answer to Hilbert's *Entscheidungsproblem* independently given by Church and Turing.

**Theorem.** Validity in classical first-order logic is undecidable.

## Logical embedding

The fact that NK is obtained by extending NJ with the ( $\neg\neg$ E) rule suggests that intuitionistic logic is a sub-system of classical logic — some results developed in classical mathematics are constructive, while others are not.

The opposite view is possible, though: classical logic can be embedded into intuitionistic logic by the *Gödel–Gentzen negative translation*.

## Assertion strength

In terms of provability,  $\vdash_{\text{NK}} \varphi \vee \neg\varphi$  does not assert that we can prove either  $\varphi$  or  $\neg\varphi$ , but that it cannot be the case that both  $\varphi$  and  $\neg\varphi$  lead to contradiction — its strength is equivalent to that of  $\vdash_{\text{NJ}} \neg(\neg\varphi \wedge \neg\neg\varphi)$ .

- A disjunctive proposition  $\varphi \vee \psi$  in classical logic only amounts to  $\neg(\neg\varphi^\circ \wedge \neg\psi^\circ)$  in intuitionistic logic.
- An existential statement  $\exists v. \varphi$  in classical logic only amounts to  $\neg\forall v. \neg\varphi^\circ$  in intuitionistic logic.
- An atomic proposition  $p \ t_1 \dots t_n$  in classical logic only amounts to the assertion that the opposite is impossible, i.e.,  $\neg\neg(p \ t_1 \dots t_n)$ .

As for  $\perp$ , ' $\wedge$ ', ' $\rightarrow$ ', and ' $\forall$ ', their strength are the same in classical and intuitionistic logic.

## Gödel–Gentzen negative translation

**Definition.** Given a signature  $\mathcal{S} = (\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{F})$ , the *Gödel–Gentzen negative translation*  $\_{}^\circ : \text{FORM}_{\mathcal{S}} \rightarrow \text{FORM}_{\mathcal{S}}$  is defined by

$$\begin{aligned}\perp^\circ &= \perp \\ (p \ t_1 \ \dots \ t_n)^\circ &= \neg\neg(p \ t_1 \ \dots \ t_n) \quad \text{for } p : \mathcal{P} \\ (\varphi \wedge \psi)^\circ &= \varphi^\circ \wedge \psi^\circ \\ (\varphi \vee \psi)^\circ &= \neg(\neg\varphi^\circ \wedge \neg\psi^\circ) \\ (\varphi \rightarrow \psi)^\circ &= \varphi^\circ \rightarrow \psi^\circ \\ (\forall v. \varphi)^\circ &= \forall v. \varphi^\circ \\ (\exists v. \varphi)^\circ &= \neg\forall v. \neg\varphi^\circ.\end{aligned}$$

## Gödel–Gentzen negative translation

**Theorem.** For any first-order formula  $\varphi$  and list  $\Gamma$  of first-order formulas,  $\Gamma \vdash_{\text{NK}} \varphi$  if and only if  $\Gamma^\circ \vdash_{\text{NJ}} \varphi^\circ$ .

PROOF

**1** ASSUME  $\mathcal{S}$  signature,  $\varphi : \text{FORM}_{\mathcal{S}}$ ,  $\Gamma : \text{LIST FORM}_{\mathcal{S}}$ ,  
 $\Gamma^\circ \vdash_{\text{NJ}} \varphi^\circ$

PROVE  $\Gamma \vdash_{\text{NK}} \varphi$

PROOF

**1.1**  $\vdash_{\text{NK}} \varphi \leftrightarrow \varphi^\circ$ .

**1.2**  $\Gamma^\circ \vdash_{\text{NK}} \varphi^\circ$ . PROOF All rules of NJ are rules of NK.

**1.3** QED. PROOF By **1.1**, the “Gödel–Gentzen formulas” in **1.2** can be replaced by their untranslated versions under NK.

## Gödel–Gentzen negative translation

2 **ASSUME**  $\mathcal{S}$  signature

**PROVE**  $\Gamma^\circ \vdash_{\text{NJ}} \varphi^\circ$  for every  $\varphi : \text{FORM}_{\mathcal{S}}$  and  
 $\Gamma : \text{LIST FORM}_{\mathcal{S}}$  such that  $\Gamma \vdash_{\text{NK}} \varphi$ .

**PROOF**

2.1  $\vdash_{\text{NJ}} \psi^\circ \leftrightarrow \neg\neg\psi^\circ$  for any  $\psi : \text{FORM}_{\mathcal{S}}$ . (For the Gödel–Gentzen formulas, double negation elimination is admissible in NJ.)

2.2 QED.

**PROOF** Induction on the derivation of  $\Gamma \vdash_{\text{NK}} \varphi$ , using double negation elimination where necessary.

3 QED.

**PROOF** The two directions are proved in [1](#) and [2](#).

## Gödel–Gentzen negative translation

Case ( $\forall E$ ).

**ASSUME**  $\Gamma : \text{LIST FORM}_{\mathcal{S}}, \varphi, \psi, \vartheta : \text{FORM}_{\mathcal{S}},$   
 $d : \text{NK}[\Gamma; \varphi \vee \psi], d' : \text{NJ}[\Gamma^\circ; \neg(\neg\varphi^\circ \wedge \neg\psi^\circ)],$   
 $e : \text{NK}[\Gamma, \varphi; \vartheta], e' : \text{NJ}[\Gamma^\circ, \varphi^\circ; \vartheta^\circ],$   
 $f : \text{NK}[\Gamma, \psi; \vartheta], f' : \text{NJ}[\Gamma^\circ, \psi^\circ; \vartheta^\circ]$

**PROVE**  $\Gamma^\circ \vdash_{\text{NJ}} \vartheta^\circ$

**PROOF** ( $d'', e''$ , and  $f''$  are suitably weakened versions of  $d'$ ,  $e'$ , and  $f'$ .)

$$\begin{array}{c}
 \frac{\Gamma^\circ, \neg\vartheta^\circ, \varphi^\circ \vdash \neg\vartheta^\circ}{\Gamma^\circ, \neg\vartheta^\circ, \varphi^\circ \vdash \perp} \text{e''} \quad (\rightarrow E) \quad \frac{\Gamma^\circ, \neg\vartheta^\circ, \psi^\circ \vdash \neg\vartheta^\circ}{\Gamma^\circ, \neg\vartheta^\circ, \psi^\circ \vdash \perp} f'' \quad (\rightarrow E) \\
 \frac{\Gamma^\circ, \neg\vartheta^\circ, \varphi^\circ \vdash \perp}{\Gamma^\circ, \neg\vartheta^\circ \vdash \neg\varphi^\circ} \quad (\rightarrow I) \quad \frac{\Gamma^\circ, \neg\vartheta^\circ, \psi^\circ \vdash \perp}{\Gamma^\circ, \neg\vartheta^\circ \vdash \neg\psi^\circ} \quad (\rightarrow I) \\
 \frac{d'' \quad \Gamma^\circ, \neg\vartheta^\circ \vdash \neg\varphi^\circ \wedge \neg\psi^\circ}{\Gamma^\circ, \neg\vartheta^\circ \vdash \perp} \quad (\wedge I) \quad (\rightarrow E) \\
 \frac{\Gamma^\circ, \neg\vartheta^\circ \vdash \perp}{\Gamma^\circ \vdash \neg\neg\vartheta^\circ} \quad (\rightarrow I) \\
 \frac{\Gamma^\circ \vdash \neg\neg\vartheta^\circ}{\Gamma^\circ \vdash \vartheta^\circ} \quad \boxed{2.1}
 \end{array}$$



## Classical logic as a sub-language of intuitionistic logic

We might view

- the language of classical logic as a convenient way of writing the Gödel–Gentzen formulas in intuitionistic logic, and
- NK as an abstraction with which we can write certain indirect proofs in NJ more easily as direct proofs.

Under this view, intuitionistic logic is in fact a richer language, which has stronger disjunction and existential quantification and thus can distinguish constructive theorems from non-constructive ones (whereas classical logic cannot).